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West v. Mead Data Central: Has
Copyright Protection Been Stretched
Too Far?
by THOMAS P. HIGGINS*
Introduction
Users of Lexis1 will not find pinpoint cites2 to page numbers
in West's reporters. In a decision that has raised some eye-
brows in the legal community,3 the Eighth Circuit held that
Mead Data Central's (MDC) case retrieval system, LEXIS,
probably infringes on the copyright of West Publishing's case
reporters by including West's page numbers in its database.4
The decision raises important questions about the extent of
copyright protection. For example, the Arabic number system
is not copyrightable,5 and neither are judicial opinions.6 How-
* A.B., Vassar College; Member, Third Year class. A version of this note was
entered in the Nathan Burkan Memorial Competition by Hastings College of the Law.
1. LEXIS is the computer-assisted research system created by Mead Data Cen-
tral (MDC).
2. Pinpoint cites, also called jump cites or star pagination, are page breaks within
the text that indicate where that part of the text can be found in another reporter.
West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc., 799 F.2d 1219, 1222 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 962 (1987). Pinpoint cites are especially important for lawyers,
law students, paralegals and judges, since the pinpoints direct the reader to the exact
location of cited text in a reporter. In addition, pinpoint cites are required in briefs
and other papers filed with most courts.
3. Reidinger, Cite Wars: Lexis Can't Use West's Pages, 72 A.B.A.J. 78 (1986).
4. West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Central, Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 962 (1987).
5. Id. at 1227 ("two always comes after one, and no one can copyright the mere
sequence of Arabic numbers"). See also Callaghan v. Meyers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888). As
counsel for Defendant Callaghan said:
Ever since the invention of printing, books have been paged in numerical
order, and appellee might with equal propriety claim an exclusive property
in the system of Arabic numerals as in the paging of his books. Moreover,
the printed paging is merely the mechanical labor of the printer, and is never
performed by the author or publisher.
Id. at 641 (Mr. J. L. High for Defendant Callaghan).
6. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet
Management Sys., 591 F. Supp. 726, 735 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
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ever, compilations of judicial opinions are copyrightable.7 Was
the court correct in finding that West's copyright in the compi-
lations extended to include the page numbers?8 Is the decision
consistent with the goals of copyright? Does the opinion reveal
the inadequacies of the Copyright Act in dealing with the over-
lap between new and old ways of disseminating information?9
This note addresses the questions raised by West v. MDC.
Part I gives a brief overview of copyright law, including four
cases that the Eighth Circuit discussed. Part II examines the
opinions of the district court, the Eighth Circuit, and the sepa-
rate opinion of Judge Oliver.10 Part III discusses three possible
ways to change the result of West v. MDC.
I
The Facts
West publishes volumes of court opinions which it calls its
National Reporter System." The volumes contain helpful fea-
tures such as indices, tables, names of counsel, synopses of the
cases, and headnotes with references to West's Keynote Num-
bering System. 12
MDC does not publish case reporters, but it has a computer-
assisted legal research system called LEXIS.13 LEXIS allows
7. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). See infra notes 24-53 and accompanying text.
8. The District Court said that "West's page numbers and its arrangement of
cases are necessarily within the scope of copyright protection." West Publishing Co. v.
Mead Data Central, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1571, 1577 (D. Minn. 1985). Cf. West, 799 F.2d at
1237 (opinion of Oliver, J.). The Eighth Circuit held that "the copyright we recognize
here is in West's arrangement, not in its numbering system; MDC's use of West's page
numbers is problematic because it infringes West's copyrighted arrangement, not be-
cause the numbers themselves are copyrighted." Id. at 1228.
9. See West, 616 F. Supp. at 1578.
10. The separate opinion of Judge Oliver was twice as long as the majority opinion
of Judge Arnold. While some of the separate opinion concerns procedure, see id. at
1230-31, the remainder concerns copyright.
11. These are well-known in the legal profession: Supreme Court Reporter, Fed-
eral Reporter, Federal Supplement, California Reporter, New York Supplement,
North Eastern Reporter, et al. For a complete listing, see WEST'S LAW FINDER: A
REASEARCH MANUAL FOR LAWYERS 5-10 (rev. ed. 1985).
12. Key Number Digests are indices published by West. The Key Number is a
fixed number given to a specific point of case law, such as Intoxicating Liquors Key
Number 285. Attorneys can go to the Key Digests under that heading and find other
cases that deal with the subject.
Generally speaking, "[a] complete report of a decided case usually includes the syl-
labus or headnote; the names of the respective counsel ... the statement of the case
... and the opinion of the court." 77 C.J.S. Reports § 2 (1982).
13. See supra note 1. As MDC states, LEXIS is a versatile research tool: "LEXIS
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users to review court opinions and statutes on a computer.
MDC announced that it planned to include page numbers from
West's reporters in its database, enabling its users to know ex-
actly where the text on the screen could be found in West's
reporters.14 Thus, LEXIS users would be able to research
through LEXIS instead of West's reporters, but still be able to
give pinpoint cites to West's reporters. MDC called its pro-
posed service "star pagination.'
15
When West heard about MDC's intentions, it sought a pre-
liminary injunction in the U.S. District Court of Minnesota. 16
The District Court granted the injunction 17 and MDC appealed.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that MDC's use of the
page numbers probably infringed on West's copyright.1 " John
W. Oliver, Senior District Judge, filed a separate opinion con-
curring with the procedural analysis but dissenting from the
majority's view of the copyright issues. 9
II
General Copyright Law
A. Historical Background
Ages before Sir William Blackstone published his famed
Commentaries, 0 the Irish King Diarmed settled a dispute be-
tween Abbot Fennian and St. Columba over the latter's copying
of the Abbot's Psalter, finding for the Abbot and declaring "to
every cow her calf."' 2 ' This is the essential tenet of copyright
law: the author or originator of certain literary works or artis-
tic productions has a vested right to make copies of the works,
publish them, and sell them.22
.. can do research impossible by any other means. Here's an example .... Of all law
review articles on LEXIS... which has the most footnotes? The solution.., is quick,
startlingly simple, and makes effective use of LEXIS' literalism." Great Lexpecta-
tions: Mead Data Central's Newsletter for Law Schools, Dec. 1984, at 1. LEXIS' chief
competitor is Westlaw, West Publishing's computer-assisted research system.
14. West, 799 F.2d. at 1222.
15. Id.
16. West, 616 F. Supp. at 1571.
17. Id.
18. West, 799 F.2d at 1219.
19. Id. at 1230.
20. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND IN FOUR BOOKS
(Tucker ed. 1803).
21. W. PATRY, LATMAN'S THE COPYRIGHT LAW 2 (6th ed. 1986).
22. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985).
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American copyright law is a direct descendant of English
law,23 particularly the Statute of Anne.24 The Statute of Anne,
the first statute concerned exclusively with copyright,25 was
also the first to recognize specifically the rights of authors.26
Federal power to enact copyright statutes is expressly pro-
vided by the Constitution.2 ' The first U.S. copyright statute
was the Copyright Act of 1790.28 Numerous revisions and
amendments took place over the next century29 until the Copy-
right Act of 1909.30 The 1909 Act was the product of several
years of painstaking effort and "discussion on the part of every
interest involved, including eminent members of the bar.''31
The 1909 Act was in turn replaced by the Copyright Act of
1976,32 which greatly simplified the trigger mechanism for pro-
tection of works33 and was intended to be flexible enough to
accommodate new technologies such as computer programs and
electronic databases. 34  Amendments to the 1976 Act have at-
23. W. PATRY, supra note 21, at 2. Professor Patry gives a clear synopsis of the
history of copyright, including tidbits from Blackstone, Venetian decrees, Catholic
Queen Mary and the "Stationer's Company," the Star Chamber, and the Statute of
Anne. See id. at 2-5.
24. 8 Anne ch. 19 (1710). The full title is An Act for the Encouragement of Learn-
ing, by Vesting the Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such
Copies, during the Times therein mentioned. See H. RANSOM, THE FIRST COPYRIGHT
STATUTE 3, 109 (1956).
25. H. RANSOM, supra note 24, at 3.
26. W. PATRY, supra note 21, at 4.
27. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 states in pertinent part:
The Congress shall have Power... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries. Id.
28. Act of May 31, 1790, 1 Stat. 124 (1790) (repealed 1831). Like the Statute of
Anne, the Act had certain formalities and restrictions, such as recording title prior to
publication and depositing a copy of the work. See W. PATRY, supra note 21, at 6.
29. See, e.g., Act of April 29, 1802, 7th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 Stat. 171 (1802) (repealed
1819); Act of February 3, 1831, 21st Cong., 2d Sess., 4 Stat. 436 (1831).
30. 17 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1909) (repealed 1978).
31. W. PATRY, supra note 21, at 9.
32. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-18 (1976) [hereinafter 1976 Act].
33. The 1909 Act would protect a work upon publication, whereas the 1976 Act
protects a work upon fixation. Compare 1909 Act, supra note 30, at § 2 (preserving
common law rights for unpublished works, inferring lack of protection under statute);
with 1976 Act, supra note 32, at §§ 101, 102 (a work must be fixed in a "tangible me-
dium of expression"). In other words, once a person creates an original work, the 1976
Act protects it; the same person would have had to publish the work in order to get
protection from the 1909 Act. Thus, the anomoly that a playwright who had his play
performed was not protected by the 1909 Act unless the script was published.
34. New technology poses some problems for copyright law:
While copyright has traditionally concerned itself with the craft of the au-
thor, composer, and artist, present-day copyright disputes are increasingly
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tempted to keep copyright law current with technological
advances.3 5
B. Copyright for Compilations
The Copyright Act of 1976 expressly extends protection to
compilations.36 A compilation is a work that is "formed by the
collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data
that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that
the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of
authorship. ' 37 Compilations include "collective works," such as
anthologies or encyclopedias.3 ' Thus, phone books3 9 and case
reporters 4° are copyrightable compilations, but the production,
arrangement and flow of a Christmas parade is not.41 While
the names and addresses of a phone book are not copyrightable
per se 4 2 the book itself, an original work formed by the indus-
trious collection, selection, organization, and arrangement of
material,43 is copyrightable and protectable as a compilation."
"Copyright law and compilations are uneasy bedfellows.
4 5
likely to involve computer programs, electronic data bases, and the transmis-
sion or reception of copyrighted works by satellite, microwave, and a host of
other new technological marvels. With increasing frequency, the courts are
being asked to fit these new technological uses into a copyright act which,
while designed to be flexible in order to accommodate such new technologies,
is nevertheless occasionally unequal to the task a mere seven years after its
general effective date.
W. PATRY, supra note 21, at 1.
35. E.g., The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98
Stat. 3347 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14) (1986) (expressly extending copyright pro-
tection to include "semiconductor chip products" and "mask works").
36. "The subject matter of copyright as specified by section 102 includes compila-
tions and derivative works .. " 1976 Act, supra note 32, at § 103(a).
37. Id. at § 101.
38. Id.
39. Hutchinson Tel. Co. v. Fronteer Directory Co., 770 F.2d 128 (8th Cir. 1985),
reversing 586 F. Supp. 911 (D.C. Minn. 1984); Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Associ-
ated Tel. Directory Publishers, 756 F.2d 801 (11th Cir. 1985).
40. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834); Banks Law Publishing Co. v.
The Lawyers' Co-operative Publishing Co., 169 F. 386 (2d Cir. 1909) (discussed infra
notes 98-104 and accompanying text); see also West, 799 F.2d at 1224.
41. Production Contractors, Inc. v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 622 F.
Supp. 1500 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
42. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985)
("no author may copyright his ideas or the facts he narrates").
43. Jeweler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 F. 83 (2d
Cir. 1922).
44. Cooling Sys. and Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d 485, 492 (9th
Cir. 1985). See also 1976 Act, supra note 32, at § 103(a).
45. Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 862 (2d Cir. 1984).
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Affording copyright protection to a Shakespearean sonnet
seems more justifiable than protecting a phone book.46 The
Constitution grants Congress the power to make copyright stat-
utes in order "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, ' 47 and some courts have taken the phrase to mean that a
work must contain some substantial creativity or novelty.48
Nevertheless, novelty "has nothing to do with the validity of
the copyright. 49 Originality is the only requirement. °
C. Fair Use
The 1976 Act codified the judicial doctrine of fair use,51 one of
the most important and well-established limitations on the ex-
clusive rights of copyright.52 Fair use is the idea that some ma-
terial, though protected by copyright, may be used by others in
a reasonable manner without the consent of the copyright
holder." The doctrine, as an equitable rule of reason, is not
46. Since Shakespeare's work is almost 400 years old, it is in the public domain
and can be used by anyone. See, e.g., 1976 Act, supra note 32, at § 302 (a copyright
exists for the life of the author plus 50 years). The District Court, the Eighth Circuit
majority, and the separate opinion all refer to Shakespeare. See West, 799 F.2d at 1235
n.17. The majority thought that invoking Shakespeare would demonstrate the value
of protecting case compilations: "An arrangement of opinions in a case reporter, no
less than a compilation and arrangement of Shakespeare's sonnets, can qualify for
copyright protection." Id. at 1224.
47. U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
48. "Obviously, the Constitution does not authorize such a monopoly grant to one
whose product lacks all creative originality .... Plaintiff therefore must lose unless
he has shown that his work contains some substantial, not merely trivial, originality
..... Chamberlin v. Uris Sales Corp., 150 F.2d 512, 513 (2d Cir. 1945); cf Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (Mr. Justice Holmes cautioned
against judging the "worth" of works.).
For a thorough refutation of the view that this clause limits protection of obscene,
immoral, or merely amusing original works, see 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPY.
RIGHT § 103[B] (1986).
49. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879).
50. 1976 Act, supra note 32, at § 102. Original means that the work "owes its ori-
gin" to the "author." Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58
(1884); Toro Co. v. R & R Prods. Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1213 (8th Cir. 1986).
The requirement for originality is very low. For example, in determining whether
one person's version of a subject contains sufficiently distinguishable variations from
another's version, it is enough that "a shock caused by a clap of thunder" caused the
second to inadvertently vary from the original. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine
Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 105 (2d Cir. 1951) (opinion by Frank, J.); see also L. Batlin &
Sons v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976).
51. 1976 Act, supra note 32, at § 107. The concept was named "fair use" in Law-
rence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 60 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8, 136).
52. N. BOORSTYN, COPYRIGHT LAW 312, § 10:27 (1981).
53. See H. BALL, LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944), cited in
Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985).
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readily susceptible to a real definition, and no general defini-
tion has emerged.54 Indeed, its equitable virtue is also its vice:
no less an authority than Judge Learned Hand5 5 agreed that
the fair use doctrine is "the most troublesome in the whole law
of copyright.
56
Strictly speaking, the 1976 Act does not attempt to define fair
use: it lists "factors to be considered" for the purpose of "deter-
mining whether the use made of a work in any particular case
is a fair use.' ' 7 Those factors include the purpose and character
of the use, the nature of the work itself, the amount of the
work used, and the effect on the work's market or value. 8
The courts have not satisfactorily defined fair use either, but
certain tendencies are apparent. Generally, using an insubstan-
tial amount of a copyrightable work is fair.59 When copyrighted
material is used in a commercial context, such as in an adver-
tisement or by a competitor, courts have been unwilling to find
54. N. BOORSTYN, supra note 52, at 313. One court has said, "The [fair use] doc-
trine is entirely equitable and is so flexible as virtually to defy definition." Time, Inc.
v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
55. Judge Hand has written the opinions of many important copyright cases, in-
cluding Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), cert denied, 282
U.S. 902 (1931); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49 (2d Cir. 1936);
and Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. Supp. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
56. Dellar v. Samuel Goldwyn, Inc., 104 F.2d 661, 662 (2d Cir. 1939) (per curiam
opinion of L. Hand, Augustus N. Hand, and Patterson, JJ.).
57. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[A] (1986), citing 1976 Act, supra
note 32, at § 107.
58. 1976 Act, supra note 32, at § 107. The section reads in full:
Sec. 107. Limitations on Exclusive Rights: Fair Use
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any
other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, com-
ment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors
to be considered shall include -
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.
Id.
59. In an article about the history of the Green Bay Packers, verbatim use of the
chorus of the official fight song, "Go! You Packers, Go!" was a fair use. Karll v. Curtis
Publishing Co., 39 F. Supp. 836 (E.D. Wis. 1941). Similarly, fair use was found when a
political commercial on television used a portion of the plaintiff's song. Keep Thom-
son Governor Comm. v. Citizens for Gallen Comm., 457 F. Supp. 957 (D. N.H. 1978).
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a fair use.60 In addition, use of creative material, as opposed to
factual material, is often found to infringe on the copyright.61
III
The Key Cases
A. Wheaton v. Peters: The Highest Court Articulates
the Goals of Copyright
Wheaton v. Peters62 was the first significant United States
Supreme Court copyright case.63 Henry Wheaton, reporter of
the Supreme Court from 1816 until 1827, sued Richard Peters,
reporter of the Supreme Court from 1827 to 1843, for selling a
condensed version of the Supreme Court's opinions which in-
cluded reports gathered during Wheaton's term.64 In holding
that Peters did not infringe upon Wheaton's copyright, the
court said:
It may be proper to remark that the court are unanimously of
opinion, that no reporter has or can have any copyright in the
60. The commercial inquiry flows from the 1976 Act: "[Flactors to be considered
shall include ... whether such use is of a commercial nature." 1976 Act, supra note
32, at § 107(1). Thus, advertising is less likely to get fair use protection due to its com-
mercial nature. Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir.
1983). But see Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 621 F.2d
1318 (5th Cir. 1980) (court rejected the notion that advertisements are a form of com-
mercial use per se ineligible for fair use).
If the work is used by a competitor, then the use might not be fair because of an
adverse "effect... upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work."
1976 Act, supra note 32, at § 107(4). Thus, in a case where defendant put on a play
that used substantial portions of the novel Gone With The Wind, the court held that
the overall intent of both was to entertain: "[Flair use cannot be applied to 'Scarlett
Fever' because its function is identical to the functions of the film 'Gone With The
Wind' and the novel Gone With The Wind .. " Metro Goldwyn-Mayer v. Showcase
Atlanta Co-op. Prod., 479 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979). See also 3 M. NIMMER, supra
note 57 at § 13.05[B] ("If both the plaintiff's and the defendant's works are used for
the same purpose, then under the functional test the defense of fair use should not be
available since the defendant's work serves the same function as that of the
plaintiff's.").
61. "It is, nevertheless, true that copyright protection is narrower, and the corre-
sponding application of the fair use defense greater, in the case of factual works than
in the case of works of fiction or fantasy." 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 57, at
§ 13.05[A][2]. See Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 563
(1985). See also Dow Jones & Co. v. Bd. of Trade, 546 F. Supp. 113, 120 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) ("[C]ompilations of factual material ... should be most conducive to fair use.
Authors of compilations, therefore, must be held to grant broader licenses for subse-
quent use than persons whose work is truly creative.").
62. 33 U.S. 591 (1834).
63. M. NIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON COPYRIGHT 37 (2d ed. 1979).
64. Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 593-95.
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written opinions delivered by this court; and that the judges
thereof cannot confer on any reporter any such right.6 5
The case was sent back to the circuit court to see if Mr.
Wheaton had complied with the statutes in full, since his mar-
ginal notes were properly copyrightable.66 The acrimonious
dispute was settled years later.
The holding seems clear enough: judicial opinions are not
copyrightable. This concept has been applied to government
publications, as can be seen in various acts68 up to the 1976
Act. 69
But the rationale behind the decision is just as important. A
copyright monopoly is not for the benefit of the author; it is for
the benefit of the public.70 Copyright monopolies are not ges-
tures of gratitude: authors are rewarded in order to motivate
them to create more works.71 A judge is already duty-bound to
render opinions, so financial reward through copyright will not
promote more opinions.72 Recent copyright decisions echo
Wheaton,73 and this idea is the "cornerstone" of copyright to
65. Id. at 668.
66. See Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617, 649-50 (N.D.Ill. 1888) taken from Gray v.
Russell, 1 Story 11 (1839). Justice Story said:
[I]t was held, that the opinions of the court, being published under the au-
thority of Congress, were not the proper subject of private copyright. But it
was as little doubted by the court, that Mr. Wheaton had a copyright in his
own marginal notes, and in the arguments of counsel as prepared and ar-
ranged in his work. [Remanding the case to the Circuit Court] would have
been wholly useless and nugatory, unless Mr. Wheaton's marginal notes and
abstracts of argument could have been the subject of a copyright....
Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 649-50.
67. "Before the appeal could be heard... both of the principal parties had died:
Wheaton, on March 11, 1848, and Peters, less than two months later, on May 2, 1848.
Ultimately, their estates settled the litigation for a mere $400 in 1850." C. Joyce, The
Rise of the Supreme Court Reporter: An Institutional Perspective on Marshall Court
Ascendancy, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1291, 1385 (1985).
68. Printing Law of 1895, 28 Stat. 608 (1895) (codified at 44 U.S.C. § 505 (1976)) (no
copyright in government publications).
69. 1976 Act, supra note 30, at § 105. Cf. The Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. § 8
(repealed 1978): "No copyright shall subsist in... any publication of the United States
Government, or any reprint in whole or in part thereof .. " Id.
70. Joyce, supra note 67, at 1386-87.
71. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. Copyright "promotes the ... useful Arts." Id.
72. See infra note 97 and accompanying text. Allowing. copyright for opinions
would be to reward judges for their judicial labors.
73. The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlim-
ited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the
limited grant is a means by which an important public purpose may be
achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inven-
tors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the
1987]
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this day."4
B. Callaghan v. Myers: Infringement Based
on an Older Standard
Myers, the plaintiff, owned the copyright to "Illinois Re-
ports," volumes of reports of the Supreme Court of Illinois that
had been compiled by the official reporter.75 After negotiations
concerning the sale of Myers' copyright broke down, Callaghan
published a set of reporters anyway.76 Callaghan defended the
action based on the "broad proposition" that law reports are
public property and not susceptible of private ownership,77 and
that the official reporter was not an "author" within the mean-
ing of Congress. 7 The court, after addressing lengthy proce-
dural problems of publication and notice, ruled that the
arrangement of the volumes was copyrightable and Callaghan
had infringed.79
First, Callaghan insisted that the headnotes were not pro-
tected since all he did was abridge Myers' facts into clearer
form. ° Second, Callaghan claimed that the arrangement of
cases was not protected since the system used was "as old as the
system of law-reporting. ' 8 1 As to the different volumes, Calla-
ghan claimed chance alone governed the selection of cases.8 2
Finally, the paging lacked originality since the printed page
number is the labor of the printer.8 "
The Supreme Court adopted the circuit court opinion of
Judge Drummond on the question of infringement. Judge
Drummond found substantial similarity and infringement,
products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has
expired.
Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
74. "The basic premise of the Court's opinion - that copyright is a monopoly
recognized by law primarily for the benefit of the public rather than the author, and is
therefore attended by appropriate limitations and conditions - has remained the cor-
nerstone of construction in this field down to the present day." Joyce, supra note 67,
at 1387.
75. Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 619.
76. Id. at 622.
77. Id. at 645.
78. Id. at 646-47.
79. Id. at 667.
80. Id. at 640-41.
81. Id. at 641.
82. Id.
83. Id.
[Vol. 10:95
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based almost wholly on the headnotes8 4 Judge Drummond
placed great weight on the fact that Callaghan had copied the
mistakes of Myers in compiling the volumes.8 5 But when it
came to page numbers, Judge Drummond said:
The fact appears to be... that in arranging the order of cases,
and in the paging of the different volumes, [Myers'] edition has
been followed by the defendants; but, while this is so, I should
not feel inclined . . . to give a decree to plaintiff .... [T]he
arrangement of cases and the paging of the volumes is a labor
inconsiderable in itself, and I regard it, not as an independent
matter, but in connection with other similarities .... 8
Thus, without Callaghan's wholesale copying of Myers' head-
notes and the "smoking gun" of copying Myers' mistakes in the
actual opinions, the arrangement would not have been in-
fringed, and more importantly for West v. MDC, the pagination
would not have been probative of infringement.
It is important to note the differences between the 1976 Act
and the underlying copyright statute in Callaghan. The statute
upon which the Supreme Court in Callaghan relied was the Act
of February 3, 1831, chapter 16.87 Unlike the 1976 Act, the stat-
ute is devoid of any references to originality, compilations, ar-
rangement, coordination, or selection.8 Labor, talent, and
judgment was the standard at the time.8 9 This standard empha-
sizes the actions of the compiler, not the nature of the resulting
work. The key inquiry under the 1976 Act is not whether the
person sweat and labored while compiling, but whether the re-
sulting work is original.90 "Labor" suggests that the work must
be the product of hard work, but the amount of effort is not an
element of copyright today.91 In addition, "talent" suggests cre-
84. Id. at 659-61.
85. Id. at 662.
86. Id. at 661-62.
87. Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (1831). See Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 651.
88. [A]ny person or persons ... who shall be the author or authors of any
book or books, map, chart, or musical composition .... or who shall invent,
design, etch, engrave [or] work... from his own design, any print or engrav-
ing ... shall have the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, publishing,
and vending... for the term of twenty-eight years.
Act of February 3, 1831, ch. 16, 4 Stat. 436 (1831). The next sixteen sections concern
notice, publication, recording, and fees, with no description of the scope of the
copyright.
89. Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 662.
90. 1976 Act, supra note 32, at § 102. See supra note 50.
91. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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ativity, which again has nothing to do with copyright today.92
C. Banks v. Manchester: Reaffirming Wheaton's Rationale
Banks v. Manchester was decided November 19, 1888 - one
month before Callaghan.93 An Ohio statute permitted the offi-
cial reporter of the Supreme Court of Ohio to obtain a copy-
right in the opinions he published. Plaintiff Banks, the official
reporter of Ohio, sought an injunction under the statute perpet-
ually restraining defendant from printing and publishing deci-
sions.94 The Supreme Court assumed that the opinions, the
statements of the case, and the syllabuses or headnotes were
exclusively the work of the judges for purposes of the action.95
Mr. Justice Blatchford, again delivering the opinion of the
court as in Callaghan, determined that the statute was uncon-
stitutional in light of Wheaton: "In no proper sense can the
judge who, in his judicial capacity, prepares the opinion or deci-
sion, the statement of the case and the syllabus or headnote, be
regarded as their author or proprietor ....- 9 In accord with
Wheaton, judges can have no copyright in "the fruits of their
judicial labors, ' '97 whether the fruits are headnotes or opinions.
D. Banks Law Pub. Co. v. The Lawyers' Co-operative Publishing
Co.: No Infringement for Star Pagination
Banks, official reporter of the Supreme Court, sued Lawyers'
Co-operative for infringement arising out of the arrangement
of cases, the division into volumes, the table of cases, and
pinpoint citation.98 The Second Circuit, in a per curiam opin-
ion, adopted the opinion of Judge Hazel of the Southern Dis-
trict of New York99 and found no infringement. The court only
added two sentences:
It is not necessary to discuss so much of the opinion below as
deals with the questions of assignment and of the right of the
official reporter to secure copyrights. We concur with Judge
Hazel in his reasoning and conclusion that the arrangement of
92. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
93. 128 U.S. 244 (1888). Callaghan was decided December 17, 1888. Id. at 617.
94. Banks v. Manchester, 128 U.S. at 249.
95. Id. at 251.
96. Id. at 253.
97. Id.
98. Banks Law Publishing Co. v. The Lawyers' Co-operative Publishing Co., 169
F. 386 (2d Cir. 1909).
99. Id.
[Vol. 10:95
STRETCHING COPYRIGHT PROTECTION
reported cases in sequence, their paging and distribution into
volumes, are not features of such importance as to entitle the
reporter to copyright protection of such details. 00
It is fitting to note that the court weighs the relative impor-
tance of the features, while the standard today is originality.10'
The Act of March 3, 1905, the applicable law, did not mention
originality or arrangement.0 2
Judge Hazel's opinion, adopted by the Second Circuit, dem-
onstrates that Banks' status as official reporter was important
in finding lack of copyrightability 0 3 But the opinion also con-
tains this language directly on point for the dispute in West v.
MDC:
No authority is cited which supports the contention that com-
plainant (Banks) is entitled to be protected in its pagination
and arrangement of cases where the substance of the origina-
tion is not pirated, and in the absence of such authority I hesi-
tate to hold that the scope of the copyright act protects the
reporter.... 04
While Banks arguably lost the case because of his status as
official reporter, this language suggests that Banks would have
lost anyway, as the defendant would not have infringed by
copying the pagination.
IV
West v. MDC
A. The District Court's Opinion
The district court granted West a preliminary injunction
based on the substantial likelihood that West's case arrange-
ments are protected by copyright, and MDC's copying of West's
page numbers constitutes infringement." 5
Two cases, Callaghan and Banks, were of "particular interest
and importance in providing an analytic framework in which to
consider the claims of the parties.' ' 0 6  The district court also
undertook a "fair use" analysis, 10 7 finding the use unfair. 0 8 Fi-
100. Id. at 391.
101. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
102. Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1432, 33 Stat. 1000 (1905) (repealed 1909).
103. Banks, 169 F. at 387-88.
104. Id. at 390.
105. West, 616 F. Supp. 1571.
106. Id. at 1575-76.
107. Id. at 1580-81.
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nally, the district court addressed the public interest and found
it favored West. °9
1. The District Court's Interpretation of Callaghan
The district court placed great weight on this passage from
Callaghan:
Such work of the reporter, which may be the lawful subject of
copyright, comprehends .. . the order of arrangement of the
cases, the division of the reports into volumes, the numbering
and paging of the volumes, the table of cases cited in the opin-
ions, (where such table is made), and the subdivision of the in-
dex into appropriate, condensed titles, involving the
distribution of the subjects of the various headnotes, and cross-
references, where such exist."0°
The district court said this passage "specifically delineated the
copyrightable portions of the law reports.""'
The district court also said that West's arrangement met "the
Supreme Court's Callaghan test of labor, talent and judg-
ment.""' 2 The district court was impressed with the effort West
undertakes:
West collects cases from every state and federal court in this
country. West does not then simply take any cases it has on
hand, put them together in any order, and bind them in a
hardback volume. They first separate state court decisions
from federal court decisions. The state court decisions are fur-
ther subdivided into regions and placed in a regional reporter
appropriate for the case in question. The federal decisions are
divided at the district court and appellate court level. District
court decisions are further subdivided according to the subject
matter of the decision be they bankruptcy, federal rules or
other miscellaneous matter. This comprehensive process in-
volves considerable planning, labor, talent, and judgment on
West's part.11 3
The district court's reading of Callaghan fails to take into ac-
count the portion of Judge Drummond's opinion regarding
page numbers." 4  Judge Drummond expressed doubts about
the ability of page numbers to be copyrighted, stating that page
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1582-83.
110. Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 649 (emphasis added by the district court).
111. West, 616 F. Supp. at 1576.
112. Id. at 1576.
113. Id.
114. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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number copying is not an "independent matter," but one that
must be viewed in "connection with other similarities. ' 115 At
best, the Callaghan court recognized the possibility of page
numbers being within a copyright,11 but decided to adhere to
Judge Drummond's view. 17
In addition, Callaghan was based upon the older standard of
"labor, talent and judgment." ' The district court failed to
note this, instead applying an outdated standard.1
2. The District Court's Interpretation of Banks
Banks said that mere pagination and arrangement do not jus-
tify copyright protection, but the court further held that an of-
ficial reporter could not have a copyright according to
Wheaton.1 20 The district court found "that MDC, in relying
upon Banks, has chosen a fragile bark upon which to sail the
rocky shoals of copyright law. '1 2 1 Banks' discussion of pagina-
tion is not probative, according to the district court, because the
court did not come out and say, "We hold that copyright pro-
tection may not be had for printed arrangement and
pagination. "122
The district court attributed the lack of an unequivocal state-
ment to "the inherent nature of printing when one is mandated
to officially record a court's decision. ' 123 Copyright is not given
to official reporters because the activity of collating, arranging
and numbering "is not an exercise of independent judgment or
discretion. 1 24 Pagination "inhere[s] in the official process and
become[s] part of the public domain.' 25 When a person is re-
quired to perform those acts by law, "those labors do not reflect
any independent judgment or discretion and as such become
part of the public domain. 1 26 West, on the other hand, com-
piles cases "of its own initiative expending considerable labor,
115. Id.
116. Callaghan, 128 U.S. at 649.
117. Id. at 661-62.
118. West, 616 F. Supp. at 1576. See also supra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
119. West, 616 F. Supp. at 1576. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
120. 169 F. 386 (2d Cir. 1909). See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
121. West, 616 F. Supp. at 1577.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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talent and judgment in the process. "127
The district court's view of Banks in particular and official
reporters in general is curious. First, Wheaton held that judges
and official reporters could not get a copyright in opinions not
because judges fail to expend a fair amount of originality, but
because copyright is for the public first, authors second. 12
Copyright is granted to authors so that the financial benefits of
publication will prompt them to write more, and the public
benefits from a large body of written works.129 Since judges are
instruments of the state who are required to render opinions,
granting a copyright would not motivate them to write more
opinions. 3 ° Similarly, official reporters are acting on behalf of
the judges, and thus they do not get a copyright in the compila-
tion for the same reason: they are duty bound to compile the
cases anyway. The district court essentially states that if West
compiles the cases the work is original, but if the official re-
porter compiles the cases in an identical manner the resulting
work is not original because the official reporter is employed by
the state.13 '
This interpretation of Banks is strained: surely official re-
porters exercise just as much independent judgment and dis-
cretion as non-official reporters. 32 The court in Banks was
extending the rationale of Wheaton: no copyright for an offi-
cial reporter. The explicit language on page numbers can only
mean that if Banks was not the official reporter, the court still
might not have found infringement because pagination is sim-
ply not enough. 3
3. The Fair Use Analysis
After finding that the page numbers were protected by copy-
right, the district court undertook a fair use analysis.3 4 First it
found that the purpose and character of MDC's use was com-
127. Id.
128. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). See also supra notes 62-85 and
accompanying text.
129. Wheaton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
130. Copyright motivates through reward. See supra notes 70-74.
131. West, 616 F. Supp. at 1577.
132. The circuit court said, "We agree with MDC that the reporter in Banks exer-
cised independent judgment." West, 799 F.2d at 1225-26.
133. See discussion of Banks, supra notes 98-104 and accompanying text.
134. West, 616 F. Supp. at 1580.
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mercial, intended for profit. 35 This weighed heavily against
MDC. 36 Second, the nature of the copyrighted work was
found to be noncreative as opposed to creative.'37 This weighed
against West. Third, MDC had used a substantial amount of
the work.138 Notwithstanding that page numbers make up a
miniscule portion of a West reporter, "[w]hen viewed in light of
MDC's intent and ability to expropriate each and every page
number from each and every volume of West's reporters, the
appropriation takes on a greater magnitude .... [T]his 'small
amount' is the key to the West arrangement.' 1 39 This weighed
against MDC. 140 Finally, the effect of the infringing use on the
market was found to be great. Both works, LEXIS and West's
reporters, are used for the same purpose and fulfill the same
function.'4 ' The district court said, "There can be little doubt
that MDC's incorporation of West's page numbers into the
LEXIS reports database will supersede a substantial use of
West's hard bound volumes of reporters.' 42 The district court
said that "MDC's star pagination may do away with the need
for West's reporters .... ,,4 This weighed against MDC, too.
Thus, the district court properly concluded that MDC's use of
West's page numbers would not be fair.
4. Public Interest
The court recognized that the constitution "intended to moti-
vate creative activity by the provision of a special reward, and
eventually allows the public total access to the products of [an
author's] genius after the limited period of exclusive control
has expired."'1 44 Without economic incentive, West would not
compile and arrange reporters. The fact that "star pagination
would give judges, lawyers and citizens freer access to the en-
tire body of law" is immaterial.145 Reducing copyright protec-
tion to works of public import would create an economic
135. Id.
136. Id. See also supra note 56 and accompanying text.
137. West, 616 F. Supp. at 1580.
138. Id. at 1581.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1582-83.
144. Id. at 1582.
145. Id.
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disincentive to create works of public import. 146 The public in-
terest mandates that MDC's star pagination be restrained. 14
7
The district court was correct in recognizing the underlying
goals of copyright, but was incorrect in framing the issue. The
issue is not whether a "public import" exception should be
made: clearly this is contrary to copyright law.148  Nor is the
issue whether star pagination gives citizens "freer access" to
cases: because all the cases are in LEXIS' database, persons
have access to them even without star pagination.149 The issue
really is whether LEXIS users can have references to volumes
where the exact words of the opinions on the screen can be
found, enabling them to guide others to the exact words in
those volumes.
B. The Eighth Circuit's Opinion
1. West's Arrangement Was Protected by Copyright
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court in an opinion
by Judge Arnold. 5 ° The court noted that the 1976 Act protects
"original works of authorship,"''5 which must be the product
of some "creative, intellectual or aesthetic labor,"'15 2 no matter
how slight. West's reporters, as "compilations" under the 1976
Act, are copyrightable. 53 "An arrangement of opinions in a
case reporter, no less than a compilation and arrangement of
Shakespeare's sonnets, can qualify for copyright protection.'
5 4
The court found support for its position in Callaghan.'55
While they recognized that "[t]he teaching of Callaghan with
respect to the issues before us does not come through with un-
mistakable clarity,1 5 6 the court found that Callaghan does not
establish a per se rule against arrangement of case reporters. 5 7
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See supra note 48 (refutation of view that a work must have some objective
value to be subject to copyright).
149. As the Eighth Circuit pointed out, access is not a problem since MDC itself
reports the decisions on LEXIS. West, 799 F.2d at 1229.
150. West, 799 F.2d at 1219.
151. Id. at 1223, citing 1976 Act, supra note 30, at § 102(a).
152. West, 799 F.2d at 1223.
153. Id. at 1224.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1225.
157. As MDC points out, the treatment of case arrangement and pagination in
Callaghan was not crucial to the Court's decision, since the defendants had
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The court then disagreed with MDC that Banks established a
per se rule against copyright in the arrangement of cases. 158
The court found that Banks was based on the status of the offi-
cial reporter, and in any event should not be given "full force"
because it was based on an older standard and was only a circuit
opinion. 5 a The court did find, contrary to the district court,
that the reporter in Banks exercised independent judgment.Y0
The court found that West was not an "official reporter"
within the meaning of Wheaton and Banks, because West is not
bound by statute to create reporters.16' The court concluded,
"as did the District Court, that the arrangement West produces
through this process is the result of considerable labor, talent,
and judgment.' 62  The court also found that West's case ar-
rangements "easily" met the originality requirement of the
1976 Act. 63 Thus the arrangement of cases was subject to copy-
right, 64 and the tougher question of whether the page numbers
were within this arrangement was then addressed.
2. MDC's Use of West's Page Numbers Constituted
Infringement of West's Copyright in the
Arrangement of Cases
The court found that use of the page numbers infringed on
also made use of other portions of Myers's volumes, such as headnotes and
statements of facts.... But as we read it, Callaghan establishes at least that
there is no per se rule excluding case arrangement from copyright protection,
and that instead, in each case the arrangement must be evaluated in light of
the originality and intellectual-creation standards.
Id. at 1224-25.
158. Id. at 1225.
159. Id. at 1226.
160. Id. at 1225-26.
161. Id. at 1226.
162. Id. This older standard of labor, talent and judgment was also cited by the
district court. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. This standard fails to meet
current copyright standards. "Labor" suggests that the amount of effort involved is
relevant, and "talent" suggests some artistic standard, when it is clear that the artistic
merits of the work have nothing to do with copyright. See supra notes 48-49 and ac-
companying text. Finally, "judgment" does seem consistent with the current act, inso-
far as no objective standard of the correctness of the judgment is imposed.
The correct inquiry under the 1976 Act is whether the collection and assembly of
preexisting material is selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the re-
sulting work as a whole constitutes an original work of authorship. 1976 Act, supra
note 32, at § 101; see also supra note 50 and accompanying text. The court ultimately
did use this criteria, but only after giving credence to the labor, talent and judgment
standard. See supra note 62.
163. West, 799 F.2d at 1227.
164. Id.
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the copyright. 165 The court said, "The key to this case, then, is
not whether numbers are copyrightable, but whether the copy-
right on the books as a whole is infringed by the unauthorized
appropriation of these particular numbers.' 66 The copyright
recognized was "in West's arrangement, not in its numbering
system; MDC's use of West's page numbers is problematic be-
cause it infringes West's copyrighted arrangement, not because
the numbers themselves are copyrighted.' 167
Star pagination would "permit LEXIS users to view the ar-
rangement of cases in every volume of West's National Re-
porter System.' 68 Pinpoint cites to West's volumes infringe
because they allow LEXIS users to discern the precise location
in West's arrangement of the portion of the opinion being
viewed.1 69 With star pagination, no one would need West's re-
porters to get every aspect of West's arrangement. 70 Knowl-
edge of the location of opinions and parts of opinions within
West's arrangement is a large part of the reason one would
purchase West's volumes.' 7'
The court rejected MDC's claim that repeating the page
numbers was permissible because it merely stated pure fact. An
isolated use of factual aspects of a compilation is permissible,
the court said, but when multiplied many times it resulted in
wholesale appropriation.
72
C. Judge Oliver's Opinion
Judge Oliver concurred with the majority's procedural analy-
sis of the case, but dissented from the copyright analysis as be-
ing inconsistent with applicable law.'73 According to Judge
Oliver, the issues should have been resolved under the princi-
ples of Wheaton, Banks, and Callaghan.74
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1228.
168. Id. at 1227.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1228.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1230.
174. Id.
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1. Pagination Might Not Even Come Under Copyright
Protection of a Volume
Judge Oliver noted that the record did not support the facts
upon which the district court and majority opinions were
based.175 For example, West has no general copyright on its
"National Reporter System;" each separate volume carries its
own copyright. Very few Certificates of Copyright Registration
were in the record, and no certificates for state court opinions
were in the record. 176 Furthermore, none of the certificates
showed that West claimed a copyright in the page numbers.
The registration form required a "brief, general statement
of the material that has been added to this work and in which
copyright is claimed," and West's answer stated:
"[C]ompilation of previously published case reports including
but not limited to opinions, synopses, syllabi or case law
paragraphs, key number classifications, tables and index digest,
with revisions and additions.' ' 77
Finally, although page numbers are an important part of the
arrangement, as the majority pointed out,' this does not jus-
tify finding that they are subject to copyright. Titles are impor-
tant parts of a copyrighted volume, too, but it is beyond dispute
that titles are not subject to copyrightY.9  "All parts of a copy-
righted volume may not be automatically considered a subject
to copyright simply because a publisher claims a copyright on
the whole volume.' 80
Even assuming that West's pagination is entitled to copyright
protection as an important part of the arrangement, Judge Oli-
ver did not believe that star pagination infringed West's ar-
rangement in any way.' 8 ' Law book publishers in the United
175. Id. at 1233.
176. Id. Only twelve certificates were in the record, and all concerned lower fed-
eral court decisions. Id. at 1233 n.10.
Registration of copyright, while not a condition of copyright protection, neverthe-
less is required for certain remedies for infringement. 1976 Act, supra note 32, at
§§ 405, 408, and 412.
177. West, 799 F.2d at 1233-34. Although West did not mention page numbers, the
language "including but not limited to" means that the list was not comprehensive.
178. Id. at 1227.
179. Id. at 1234. See 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.16 at 2-186 (1987);
Duff v. The Kansas City Star, 299 F.2d 320, 323-24 (8th Cir. 1962).
180. West, 799 F.2d at 1234.
181. Id.
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States have a long tradition of star pagination.1 8 2 In addition,
current literary practice suggests that citations to compilations
of poetry are not an infringement upon such arrangements.8 3
2. Factual Determinations of the Originality of the Page
Numbers Were Necessary
Judge Oliver disagreed with the district court that "West's
page numbers and its arrangement of cases are necessarily
within the scope of copyright protection. '184 The record does
not show how or by whom West's page numbers are, in fact,
created.8 5 How the page numbers are assigned is a "total mys-
tery."'8 6 The process by which pages are numbered is an open
question that must be determined at trial. If the pagination is
nothing more than an "electronic response to a direction given
a machine" then the originality standard may not be met.8 7 In
addition, it would be "inconceivable... that the public policy
that denies all right of copyright to a court opinion would nev-
ertheless grant copyright to the page numbers of the volume in
which such a court opinion is published.' 8 8
3. The Majority and the District Court Misinterpreted the
Case Law
According to Judge Oliver, both the district court and the
majority misinterpreted the pertinent case law, particularly
Callaghan and Banks.8 9 In addition, the majority failed to dis-
cuss the leading case, Wheaton, in detail, and did not even men-
tion Manchester.9 ° For Judge Oliver, the three Supreme Court
cases are the starting point,'9 ' and the principle of law stated
and applied in all three is the same: on the basis of public pol-
182. "MDC intends to do no more than what other law book publishers have been
doing for a long, long period of time." Id. at 1235.
183. Id. Judge Oliver points out that Bartlett's Familiar Quotations gives jump
cites to the lines, the scenes and the acts of Shakespeare's plays as earlier published
by the Oxford University Press. Had Bartlett included page numbers, Judge Oliver
doubts that the addition would constitute an infringement of the arrangement. Id. at
1235 n.18.
184. Id. at 1237 (emphasis in original).
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1238.
190. Id. at 1242.
191. Id.
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icy, the Court could allow no impediment to the fullest possible
dissemination of its judgments.192 If pagination had been at is-
sue in any of the cases, "the Court would not have hesitated to
hold that star pagination in a volume of published law reports
would not be subject to copyright."'M9
According to Judge Oliver, Wheaton held that opinions were
not copyrightable on the basis of public policy, but explicitly
remanded for headnotes."' Manchester held that even head-
notes, if written by judges, were not copyrightable for the same
policy reasons as in Wheaton.95 Callaghan held that directly
copying headnotes not written by a judge was infringement, but
mentioned that page numbers alone would not have sufficed.196
Finally, the only court that considered the precise issue of star
pagination, the Second Circuit in Banks, explicitly stated that
page numbers would not be enough. 97
Thus, Judge Oliver concluded that the majority and the dis-
trict court misinterpreted the case law, improperly finding that
star pagination infringed West's copyright.
D. Comments
Judge Oliver's opinion is superior to both the district court's
and the majority's. He essentially makes three points: (1) the
statutory standard of originality was not shown; (2) the major-
ity and the district court misinterpreted the case law and its
underlying public policy; and (3) star pagination has a long tra-
dition in both legal case reporters and literature.
First, Judge Oliver was correct in pointing out that the dis-
trict court and the majority had not satisfactorily addressed the
correct legal standard of originality. The issue of whether the
page numbers are original, that is, originating with the author,
is a simple question but never addressed. If the printer, not
West, gave the pages their numbers then originality might not
192. Id. at 1245. See also id. at 1242 (citing Joyce, supra note 67, at 1390).
193. West, 799 F.2d at 1245.
194. Id. at 1240-45.
195. Id. at 1242-43; see also discussion of Banks v. Manchester, supra notes 93-97
and accompanying text.
196. West, 799 F.2d at 1242-44; see also discussion of Callaghan, supra notes 75-92
and accompanying text.
197. West, 799 F.2d at 1245-46; see Banks, 169 F. at 390. Note that the per curiam
opinion explicitly declines to base its affirmation on the official status of the reporter.
Id.
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be present. 9 ' Also, if the numbers were not "selected, coordi-
nated, or arranged" because the cases were sequential, they fail
to meet the explicit language of the 1976 Act.199 Both questions
of fact should be addressed at trial.
Second, Judge Oliver is correct about Wheaton. Wheaton's
underlying rationale echoes the Constitution: copyright protec-
tion must be given to benefit the public.20 Judicial opinions
are in the public domain because the public has a strong inter-
est in having access to them. In addition, judges are duty-bound
to create the opinions, and the financial incentives of copyright
will not promote the creation of more opinions.20 ' Since the
financial incentive of copyright is only given to promote the
creation of more works, the courts should examine whether
preventing star pagination promotes or hinders the dissemina-
tion of legal opinions in case reporters and computer databases.
By framing the issue in this way, both West's and MDC's inter-
ests can be weighed against the public good.
Third, Judge Oliver's observation that star pagination has
been around a long time is helpful. Star pagination has tradi-
tionally been used in the legal profession and in literature. It is
an important device for research. Pinpoint cites to accepted
volumes add clarity to legal briefs and literary articles. Any
decision that could very well end this tradition should be care-
fully made on undisputed facts.
V
Remedying the Result in West
A. Three Solutions
MDC, and star pagination in general, were dealt a harsh blow
by the Eighth Circuit. There are three possible ways for the
result in West v. MDC to be remedied. First, legislative
amendments to the 1976 Act could ensure star pagination. 2 2
Second, the courts could take a different approach than the
Eighth Circuit and find that page numbers are not within the
scope of copyright.20 3 Finally, MDC has other options for over-
198. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
199. 1976 Act, supra note 32, at § 101.
200. See supra notes 62-74 and accompanying text.
201. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
202. See infra notes 207-13 and accompanying text.
203. See infra notes 214-20 and accompanying text.
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coming the decision, such as using what is in the public domain,
making up their own page numbers for LEXIS, or simply pay-
ing West for use of the numbers. °4
B. Statutory Amendment
Congress could expressly allow page numbers of copyrighted
works to be used by others. The 1976 Act itself contains two
fitting methods for allowing the use of otherwise copyrightable
material: (1) expressly exempt the use;20 5or (2) require that
compulsory licenses be granted for the use, in the event that no
license can be negotiated.0 6
1. Exempt Page Numbers From Infringement
Congress could simply make the appropriation of another's
copyrighted page numbers exempt from infringement actions if
used for the purposes of star pagination. The 1976 Act exempts
certain uses from copyright actions.207 For example, perform-
ances of a copyrighted work in non-profit educational institu-
tions, in religious institutions, or in the home are exempt.20 8
Unlike a licensing amendment,20 9 this approach imposes no
financial restraints at all on star pagination. If the goal of legis-
lation is simply to let the public have star pagination, then ex-
emption succeeds.
2. Compulsory License
A second possible amendment would allow persons who want
to use page numbers to obtain a compulsory license.210 Using
the facts at hand, MDC could negotiate with West for a license
enabling MDC to use West's page numbers. If West and MDC
were unable to negotiate a fair deal, MDC could compel West to
grant a license. This compulsory license still would allow West
to receive royalties at a rate fixed by the Act.211 Even if a copy-
204. See infra notes 224-33 and accompanying text.
205. See 1976 Act, supra note 32, at § 110.
206. See 1976 Act, supra note 32, at §§ 111, 115.
207. 1976 Act, supra note 32, at § 110.
208. Id.
209. See infra notes 210-13 and accompanying text.
210. See, e.g, 1976 Act, supra note 32, at § 111 (c), (d) (compelling licensing for sec-
ondary transmissions by cable systems); id. § 115 (compelling licensing for nondra-
matic musical works).
211. Id. § 115. For example, this section allows a musician to do a version of an-
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right holder objects to the use of the work, the public interest is
served by compelling a license for such use.
The good thing about licensing is that three sides win: West,
whose original efforts are rewarded financially to some de-
gree;212 MDC, since LEXIS can now compete with the volumes
and Westlaw; and the public, which gets star pagination on
LEXIS, a real choice between Westlaw and LEXIS, and lower
prices through competition.1 3 This alternative seems to be the
best.
C. Judicial Relief
Another way for the decision to be changed is through the
courts. The case has been sent down to be tried on the facts,
and MDC might win on the merits.214 Even if MDC does not
win, MDC could appeal to the Eighth Circuit again.21 5 With a
complete record and facts sufficient to support his separate
opinion, Judge Oliver might be able persuade his fellow judges
that the copyright for arrangement should not include West's
page numbers.21 6 Short of that unlikely turn of events, the only
court available for review would be the Supreme Court of the
United States, which has denied certiorari once already.21 7
After the case is re-tried in the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme
Court could grant certiorari and adopt the reasoning of Judge
Oliver.2 1 The Court could emphasize the holding and policy
underpinnings of Wheaton, and find that the intent of the Con-
stitution was to benefit the public.21 9
While judicial action might be the quickest way to prevent
copyright from being extended to include the page numbers of
a compilation, the chances of this occuring seem remote at best.
other's song provided that the "fundamental character of the work" or integrity of the
work is not altered. Id. § (a)(2).
212. Of course, if West's future is threatened, see infra note 234, then the compul-
sory license is inadequate.
213. See infra note 223 and accompanying text (discussion of the cost of LEXIS).
214. Given the disposition of the district court, see supra notes 105-49 and accompa-
nying text, they will probably hold for West.
215. West, 799 F.2d at 1229.
216. See supra notes 173-89 and accompanying text (discussion of Judge Oliver's
separate opinion).
217. 107 S. Ct. 962 (1987).
218. See supra notes 173-89 and accompanying text (discussion of Judge Oliver's
opinion).
219. See supra notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
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D. MDC's Other Options
MDC wants to use West's page numbers because star pagina-
tion is economically beneficial. Computer-assisted research al-
ready has a big advantage over volumes in that it is much
quicker to find cases in a database than by paging through
volumes. If LEXIS has pinpoint cites the advantage over
volumes is even greater. It is possible, as the Eighth Circuit
noted, that no one would need West's reporters anymore.22 °
MDC has three options: (1) negotiate with West for use of
the page numbers, paying for the use; (2) use what is available
in the public domain; or (3) create a uniform citation form to
LEXIS.
1. Negotiate With West
West might argue: Why shouldn't MDC pay for using our
page numbers? Since the numbers are valuable, perhaps MDC
should try to negotiate with West for their use. Arguably, it is
only fair that MDC pay for giving LEXIS users access to West's
"significant work of skill and enterprise." '221 If MDC's offer is
good enough, West might accept. Indeed, this maybe the best
way for the two industry giants to resolve this problem.222
On the other hand, if West will not deal with MDC then
Westlaw has a crucial advantage over LEXIS. Star pagination
is so important that it could lead to virtual monopolization of
the industry. Competition in the field of computer-assisted
legal research is essential for keeping the already high cost
down.2 2 3
2. Use Page Numbers in the Public Domain
If West will not sell the rights to the page numbers in their
copyrighted case reporters, then MDC should use pinpoints to
page numbers in case reporters not protected by copyright. Any
220. "With MDC's star pagination, consumers would no longer need to purchase
West's reporters .. " West, 799 F.2d at 1228.
221. West, 616 F. Supp. at 1578.
222. 1 MDC has worked out agreements with The Lawyers' Cooperative Publishing
Company, Bancroft-Whitney Company, The Research Institute of America, Inc. and
the Shepard's Division of McGraw Hill, Inc. for use of copyrighted materials in
LEXIS' Auto-cite and Shepard's Citation Services. See LEXIS/NEXIS: Library Con-
tents and Alphabetical List of Files 45 (August 1986) (A Manual for LEXIS Users).
223. LEXIS generally costs between $100 and $200 per hour, depending on the
number of searches and modifications.
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arrangement done prior to 1921 is in the public domain, 224 so
MDC is free to use page numbers from all reporters published
before then. MDC could also use the page numbers of the offi-
cial reporters. 225 For example, the Government Printing Office
prints the United States Supreme Court Reports, and MDC
would be free to use star pagination for those important
volumes.226
The negative aspects of this option are obvious. If MDC can
only supply star pagination to works in the public domain, a
large portion of necessary reporters will be left out.227  For
those in the legal profession, the uncertainty of finding page
numbers on LEXIS might make incomplete star pagination
worse than no star pagination at all.
3. Create a Uniform Citation Form To LEXIS
MDC could create a citation form for LEXIS. One way
would be to add their own page numbers to the opinions, and
pinpoint cites could be made to those page numbers. Since the
initial cite to West volumes is "noninfringing fair use,"'228 one
could cite West v. Mead as: West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data
Central, 799 F.2d 1219, Lexis 16. Another way would be to cite
to the proper LEXIS command for retrieving the case, such as
West W/10 MDC. 229 Finding an exact phrase is easily accom-
224. The 1909 Act allowed two terms of twenty-eight years for a total of fifty-six
years. 1909 Act, supra note 30, at § 24. The 1976 Act extended copyright terms for
works like case reporters (i.e., works for hire) to seventy-five years from date of publi-
cation. 1976 Act, supra note 32, at § 302(c). The 1976 Act extended the terms for
works copyrighted under the 1909 Act by providing a forty-seven year period to works
in their first term (copyrighted January 1, 1950 or later) and protecting those works in
their second term (copyrighted between December 31, 1921 and December 31, 1949)
until seventy-five years after the date of their first publication. Id. § 304. Thus all
copyrights in the arrangement of case reporters published before December 30, 1921
are deemed to be within the public domain. MDC, therefore, may use star pagination
for those particular volumes.
225. Note that West's reporters, though widely cited, are not the official reporters
of any court in the United States, as that term refers to one employed by the state.
West, 799 F.2d at 1226.
226. The 1976 Act expressly provides that works of the United States Government
are not subject to copyright. 1976 Act, supra note 7, at § 105. See also supra note 124.
227. See supra note 11 for a list of West's reporters. The number is considerable.
Also, other companies have a large stake in the reporter business. For example, Ban-
croft-Whitney publishes many volumes, including Lawyers' Editions and California
Appellate Reports. Those page numbers are similarly protected by copyright.
228. West, 799 F.2d at 1222.
229. Finding a case in LEXIS requires access to the correct library acquired by
typing in the correct code. LEXIS offeres a variety of libraries: GENFED (for general
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plished by entering that phrase (or a portion of the phrase) and
having the computer locate it.230 This feature makes pinpoint
cites to a page number virtually obsolete.
There are drawbacks to this option too. MDC would have to
put considerable pressure on the industry to adopt such cita-
tions as legitimate.231 Getting the legal profession to agree to a
radical change in the acceptable way cases are cited would be
extremely difficult; traditions die hard in the law.232
Nevertheless, if computer-assisted research is part of the
wave of the future, a little foresight now will help MDC
later.33 For this reason, MDC would be wise to create a uni-
federal cases), ADMRTY (for admiralty cases), BKRPTCY (for bankruptcy cases). It
also offers libraries with cases from individual states. A new feature even gives access
to LEXIS-UK (for cases originating in Great Britain) and LEXIS-FRANCE (for cases
originating in France).
Once in the correct library, the next step is finding the correct file. LEXIS files
include US (for cases in the United States), USAPP (for appeals cases), and DIST (for
district cases). To locate a particular case one must make a search request. For exam-
ple, to find Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines, 316 F.2d 758, one can enter WEINSTEIN
W/10 EASTERN AIRLINES, or 316 PRE/5 758.
230. For example, Judge Oliver said, "The impact of Wheaton v. Peters, in my
judgment, has been both broad and lasting." In order to find that phrase one would
search the GENFED library, USAPP file, for the following: CITE(799 PRE/6 1219)
AND "BROAD AND LASTING." Once the case is retrieved, hitting the KWIC but-
ton (key-word-in-context) will bring the user the exact phrase. See, e.g., REFERENCE
MANUAL 1-18 (1985)(MDC's manual for LEXIS users).
WESTLAW, West's computer-assisted legal research system, has a similar (and
somewhat easier) system. Once a case is retrieved, a particular phrase can be found
by using the LOCATE feature. See WESTLAW REFERENCE MANUAL 8/8 - 8/9 (1985 ed.
with 1987 inserts).
231. MDC need not start at the top by trying to convince legislators and courts. If
the form were accepted by student-run legal citators, such as A Uniform System of
Citation or Blue Book (jointly put out by Pennsylvania, Yale, Columbia, and Harvard
law schools), MDC would be a long way toward universal acceptance. Other student
citators, such as the FCC Citator (Hastings) and the Maroon Book (University of Chi-
cago) offer similar forums for new forms. See 6 COMM/ENT L.J. 219 (1983) (FCC
Citator); 53 U. CHI. L.J. 1353 (1986) (Maroon Book).
232. On the legal profession's adherence to ancient principles, Chief Justice
Holmes said:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was
laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds
upon which is was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply
persists from blind imitation of the past.
Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
233. MDC claims that it is "ludicrous" and "absurd" to think that star pagination
will do away with the need for West's reporters. West, 616 F. Supp. at 1582.
Notwithstanding MDC's claim, the legal publishing field is extremely competitive.
Banks Publishing, plaintiff in two of the cases previously discussed at length, is no
longer the industry leader it once was. The court in Banks Law Publishing Co. v.
Lawyers' Co-operative Publishing Co. commented: "The complainant, the Banks Law
1987]
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L. J.
form citation form to LEXIS, and then try to get the legal pro-
fession to accept it.
D. Conclusion
The result of West v. MDC is unfortunate. Star pagination is
desirable not only for the legal profession, but for other profes-
sions as well.234 Star pagination is a helpful and venerated way
to direct scholars and readers to an exact page.235 Star pagina-
tion saves time and adds clarity. Thus, discouraging star pagi-
nation by extending copyright protection to include page
numbers has an immediate, negative effect on the public, con-
trary to the expressed goal of copyright. Barring a turn of
events at trial, LEXIS users will not have pinpoint cites for the
foreseeable future. The next time a lawyer or student does re-
search on LEXIS and wants to cite to a particular page in a
case, that person will have to look up the same case in West's
reporter. Firms, judges, lawyers, paralegals, clerks, and stu-
dents who use LEXIS will not appreciate the considerable
waste of time and money caused by double research. Those
individuals who are meant to benefit from copyright, will prob-
ably conclude that copyright has indeed been stretched too
far.
236
Publishing Company, is the successor in business of the law book publishers well
known to the profession as 'Banks & Bros.,' and which firm assigned to the complain-
ant various copyrights to the United States Reports." 169 F. at 386.
Interestingly, Banks Publishings' fall from dominance might be due in part to Con-
gress' decision in 1922 to expand the duty of the Government Printing Office (G.P.O.)
to include the United States Reports previously published by Banks. See Act of July
1, 1922, § 225, 42 Stat. 816 (1922) (giving authority to the G.P.O.); see also 28 U.S.C.
§§ 411, 412 (1952)(codification of authority of the public printer). Cf. Act of March 3,
1911, §§ 225-26, 36 Stat. 1152 (1911). ("The reporter shall cause the decisions of the
Supreme Court to be printed and published .... ) West's position as industry leader is
by no means guaranteed for the ages.
234. See West, 799 F.2d at 1235 n.18 (opinion of Oliver, J.).
235. Id. at 1235 ("MDC intends to do no more than what other law book publishers
have been doing for a long, long period of time.").
236. Some have already reached a conclusion. See 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPY-
RIGHT § 3.03, at 3-14: "Based on that factual posture [the page numbers might have
been assigned by a word processor or a printer], this case extends compilation copy-
right too far." Id.
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